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Alexander M. Bickel * and Harry H. Wellington **
Section 3ox of the Taft-Hartley Act, contend the authors, confers
upon the federal courts responsibilities which are beyond the normal
institutional capacities of those courts. Thus the proper disposition
of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, decided last term, was to
"remand" the case to Congress for further consideration of this
broad delegation of power. The authors also criticize the Court for
a tendency to fail to articulate rational grounds of decision.
N i942, a year of tranquillity in the midst of more sanguinary
conflict, Mr. Max Lerner had occasion to recall the "great con-
stitutional war" of New Deal days. "The number of amateur
constitutional sages," he wrote, "never a small one in a nation
which De Tocqueville had once described as being ruled by the
lawyer's mentality, became [in 1934-37] a bumper harvest." Re-
marking further that the Supreme Court was, of course, the victor
of the battle of 1937, and bemused perhaps by the stillness of the
moment into mistaking armistice for peace, Mr. Lerner allowed
that it was "difficult today for any conservative group to attack
the Court as a whole, because the Court rests on the essential
judicial foundation for Which the conservatives themselves fought
so bitterly. They won that fight, and they must content them-
selves with the fruits of their victory, even though the taste of
the fruits is sometimes bitter in their mouths." 1
Of course, the word conservative needs to be used with great
caution, if indeed it needs to be used at all; and it is in this in-
stance certainly misleading, to the extent that it suggests that
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I Lerner, The Great Constitutional War, 18 VA. Q. REv. 530, 538, 545 (1942).
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the victors of 1937 were a politically homogeneous group, or that
they have remained one. But the word conservative does effec-
tively evoke a type of politician and commentator arrayed in de-
fense of the Supreme Court twenty years ago and now in full cry
against it. Mr. Lerner's expectation was not fulfilled. The voices
of amateur constitutional sages again rend the air. And the
sound, often a vicious one, comes from the political right, which
appears to have forgotten "the essential judicial foundation" it
fought for.2
In the midst of the current wave of criticism, dating from
May 17, 1954, the day the first opinion in the Segregation Cases 3
came down, what is the responsibility of professional observers of
the Court's work? Plainly, the profession should defend the
Court against ill-intentioned nonsense which comes decked out in
legal trappings looking like nothing so much as the male model
in the cigarette advertisement with his medical coat and head-
mirror.' Nearly everything that is written today by way of objec-
tive appraisal is subject, however, and is often subjected to mis-
representation and misuse.5 Yet the business of the Court goes
2 For example, the late Senator Walter F. George of Georgia said in a radio
address on February 28, 1937: "Stripped to the waist, it is the obvious purpose
of those who demand this procedure [President Roosevelt's proposal] to change
the interpretation of the Constitution, the construction of the Constitution, hence
the Constitution itself." (Emphasis added.) Mr. George went on to declare that it
was a necessary consequence of government under a written constitution that the
Supreme Court have the power to interpose the will of the people, represented by
the Constitution, to the will of the legislature. The Court was there to protect the
rights of minorities, "whether of sect, creed, or race; or of business." He pleaded for
support of the Court. '81 CoNG. REc. A362-63 (1937). A vastly different spirit
pervades the Southern Manifesto of March ii, x956, which Senator George signed.
In it the Court is charged with the exercise of "naked judicial power," and a dis-
tinction is vigorously drawn between the Constitution and the Court's construc-
tion of it. See New York Times, March 12, x956, p. 19, col. 2 (late city ed.).
A similar change in attitude is reflected in the comments of Senator Styles
Bridges of New Hampshire. Compare 8i CONG. REc. A2 9 7 (i937) with New York
Times, July 3, 1957, p. 6, col. 3 (late city ed.).
For the change in attitude of a leading columnist, compare Lawrence, Judicial
Reform or Sabotage?, The United States News, Feb. 8, 1937, P. 20, with Lawrence,
"Good Behavior" of Judges-Who Defines It?, U.S. News & World Report,
July 5, 1957, p. 104.
3 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (i954).
' See nPATRic, THE SoVEPEGN STATES (1957); cf. Black, Book Review, 46
TM YAE REvIw 432 (1957).
5 Compare Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 H v. L. Rlv. i (I9s5), with Byrnes, "The Supreme Court Must Be Curbed,"
U.S. News & World Report, May 18, 1956, p. So, at 52. See also Bickel, Frank-
[Vol. 71
HeinOnline -- 71 Harv. L. Rev. 2 1957
THE LINCOLN MILLS CASE
on, and it would derogate from the role played by the profession
as a whole in the conduct of that business - a modest role, to be
sure, but, as members of the Court have themselves often said,
not an insignificant one - if the melancholy prospect of mis-
representation were allowed to create a voluntary moratorium on
criticism. The more so since one can detect in the recent output
of the Court an unfortunate tendency which may itself be a re-
action to that prospect.
The Court's product has shown an increasing incidence of the
sweeping dogmatic statement, of the formulation of results accom-
panied by little or no effort to support them in reason, in sum, of
opinions that do not opine and of per curiam orders that quite
frankly fail to build the bridge between the authorities they cite
and the results they decree.6 This is very possibly a feature,
even if not always a deliberate one, of the Court's response to
today's controversy. The controversy has undoubtedly and un-
derstandably increased the pressure for unity within the Court
and placed a great premium on opinions that speak for as many
of the Justices as possible. Hence we get opinions which have
the vacuity characteristic of desperately negotiated documents.
7
Moreover, the less an opinion says, the less there may be in it
for critics of the Court to seize upon for their own purposes; and
one wonders whether it is not for this reason also that opinions
have, of late, often said very little and have carried an air of asser-
tion, as opposed to one of deliberation and rational choice. "Great
cases like hard cases," Holmes once remarked, in a different con-
text, "make bad law." 8 One "hydraulic pressure" 9 which is ex-
erted by such cases is toward unity, unanimity if at all possible;
another is exercised by the certainty that the result, any result,
furter's Former Clerk Disputes Byrnes's Statement, U.S. News & World Report,
June 15, 1956, p. 132.
6 On the per curiam practice, see Sacks, Foreword to The Supreme Court, z953
Term, 68 HARv. L. REv. 96, 99-io3 (1954); Note, 69 HARv. L. REV. 707 (x956).
Of course, to deplore opinions that do not opine is not to condone opinions that
opine too broadly or unnecessarily. Thus it is fair to say that the dicta rather
than the holding of Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), have done most
to provoke the controversy that has followed upon the decision of that case.
7 This may be true of opinions which have failed in the effort to gain unanimity
or even unity within the majority, but which show the scars left by the effort.
Compare Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1957), with id. at 265
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
'Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (904) (dissent-
ing opinion).
9 1d. at 401 (dissenting opinion).
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will create violent controversy, no matter what is said. This
knowledge may produce the defensive tendency to withdraw from
the arena in which lies the Court's real strength, the arena of
reason and documentation, and to give battle with the weapon
that is its opponents' choice: the bare assertion.
An early specimen - early in terms of the current cycle -
of the assertive or declarative fashion in opinion-writing is the
opinion of the Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer,10 the great Steel Seizure Case of 1952. Although it is on the
whole quite a different document, the opinion of the unanimous
Court in the Segregation Cases also touches lightly, and in the
declarative manner only, on some matters, not least among them
the history of the fourteenth amendment, to which extensive argu-
ment and reargument were addressed. More strikingly, since
handing down its judgment in the Segregation Cases, the Court
has declined to write further on the general subject, disposing
by per curiam orders of a number of other cases which can only
in the loosest way be held to be governed by the decision of May,
1954.11 This is not to say that the per curiam orders were wrong.
Nor is it to say that they could not be founded in reason, only
that the Court made no effort to do so.
Several opinions from the 1956 Term manifest the retreat
from the obligation the Court has traditionally and necessarily
felt to explain its conclusions, to justify them and to relate them
to its past holdings. A salient example is Wilson v. Girard,"
which the Court heard and decided at a special sitting. This
10 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
" Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (segregation on buses in Montgomery,
Alabama); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 35o U.S. 879 (1955) (segregation on public
golf course); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (segregation
in public bathing facilities); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S.
971 (1954) (exclusion of Negroes from municipal auditorium leased to private
theatrical organization). In Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353
U.S. 230 (1957), an educational institution was involved. But the contested issue
was whether Girard College, operated under a private trust agreement and admitting
only "poor white male orphans," acquired sufficient connection with the state by
virtue of the fact that the City of Philadelphia was trustee, so that the College's
policy could be deemed state action. See Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66 YA= L.J. 979 (1957).
In the same fashion the Court has extended the doctrine of Steele v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (union has duty to represent negro minority fairly).
See Syres v. Oil Workers Union, 350 U.S. 892 (i95g); The Supreme Court, 1955
Term, 7o HAuv. L. REv. 83, 182 (1956).
22 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
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was the habeas corpus action brought in behalf of the American
soldier who, pursuant to the provisions of a protocol 13 concluded
under our security treaty with Japan, was about to be handed
over to the Japanese government for trial on a charge of homi-
cide. The petition was based on the claim that the charge grew
out of the performance by the soldier of his military duties, and
that under the circumstances the protocol could not constitution-
ally authorize his surrender for trial in a foreign court. The Su-
preme Court, in a per curiam opinion, set forth the facts in con-
siderable detail and then pronounced judgment in the following
paragraph, which is concise enough to be quoted in full precisely
because it is concise enough to be a statement of the result and
absolutely nothing more. It is as follows:
The issue for our decision is therefore narrowed to the question
whether, upon the record before us, the Constitution or legislation
subsequent to the Security Treaty prohibited the carrying out of
this provision authorized by the Treaty for waiver of the qualified
jurisdiction granted by Japan. We find no constitutional or statu-
tory barrier to the provision as applied here. In the absence of such
encroachments, the wisdom of the arrangement is exclusively for
the determination of the Executive and Legislative Branches. 4
Such a "decision" as this performs the Court's function in dis-
posing of the case before it. And we do not mean to suggest that
the disposition was anything less than the correct one. But such
a decision does not attempt to gain reasoned acceptance for the
result, and thus does not make law in the sense which the term
"law" must have in a democratic society. It may be said that
the Girard case required swift action and that time was lacking
for the elaboration of reasons. However, just how swift adjudica-
tion needed to be is arguable, and in any event the Court has
means, and has used them, for accommodating itself to such
situations.15
11 Protocol To Amend Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement Under
Article III of the Security Treaty Between the United States of America and
Japan, Sept. 29, 1953, 4 U.S. TREATiEs & OT=ER INT'L AOI EEmNTs 1846, T.IJA.S.
No. 2848.
14 354 U.S. at 530.
" The Court has, in cases of special urgency, handed down its decree and filed
opinions later. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953) ; Ex parte
Quirin, 3,7 U.S. 1 (1942). Even this practice is not to be commended. Disposition
of cases in a matter of days is simply not compatible.with the function of the
Court. See Rosenberg v. United States, supra at 3o (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
1957]
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Another instance of the same kind of failure on the part of the
Court at the last term is Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills.'6 The failure in this case is less obvious to the naked eye
than in Girard. But it appears, upon analysis, in purer form in
Lincoln Mills than in any of the other examples we have men-
tioned, and it is here least to be condoned. In Lincoln Mills, as
we shall attempt to show, difficulties of statutory construction
overlying issues of federalism and of the proper function of the
federal courts were disposed of in assertive fashion with little
apparent consideration of their implications. The disposition was
virtually without "opinion," if by opinion we mean rationally
articulated grounds of decision. 7
Perhaps the Court must be indulged succumbing occasionally to
the hydraulic pressures of intensely contested great cases such as
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.' Perhaps the agita-
tion that surrounded the Girard litigation also exerted such pres-
sures. Finally, and most plausibly, perhaps it has been the wisest
course to say nothing further, following not much to begin with,
on the unique issue of segregation -ultimately, it can be main-
tained, an unarguable moral, not a prudential issue. But, as will
appear, no considerations of any such order are relevant to
Lincoln Mills, a case which can in this respect be explained only
as the child of a habit acquired elsewhere. The case is remarkable
also because it presented to the judicial process, as we see it, a
statutory problem of a relatively rare though not unprecedented
sort, which is not susceptible of solution by any of the usual
canons of statutory construction and which has not been often
remarked. The discussion that follows is directed toward an
analysis of that problem and a critique of the Court's disposition
of the Lincoln Mills case.
I. LINCOLN MILLS: FACTS AND BACKGROUND
Lincoln Mills controlled three cases.' 9 In each an employer
who had signed a collective-bargaining agreement providing for
arbitration of disputes with a union of his employees in an indus-
16 353 U.S. 448 (i957).
17 See pp. 35-37 infra.
18343 U.S. 579 (1952).
19 Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers, 353 U.S. 550 (1957); Gen-
eral Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United Elec. Workers, 353 U.S. 547 (1957); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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try affecting commerce had then declined to submit a dispute
to arbitration. The union in each case sought in a federal district
court specific performance of the contract to arbitrate. Federal
jurisdiction was invoked under section 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act),20 which
provides that
suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor or-
ganization representing employees in an industry affecting com-
merce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
Equity jurisdiction was also invoked under section 3oi and under
the Arbitration Act.
2 1
It is to be assumed that in the face of the rather compelling
statutory language quoted above the first, and the very proper,
impulse of a judge would be to take jurisdiction and pass to the
question whether an equitable case for specific performance had
been made out, that is, to proceed to the issue of remedy. That
issue is not free of difficulties, which will be adverted to presently.
These are, however, not the only difficulties. Before reaching them
a judge may find it necessary to seek to identify what is not com-
pelling on the face of the statute, namely the source of the sub-
stantive or primary right he is to enforce, if enforce it he will.
On that identification may depend the existence of federal juris-
diction, for underneath the beguilingly plain command of the
statute lurk the complexities of federalism, including the consti-
tutional distribution of judicial powers between states and nation.
If the meaning of section 3oi is that the federal courts are
to apply federal law in suits for violation of the contracts in
question then there is, of course, no constitutional problem. The
power of Congress under the commerce clause to enact a federal
law of labor contracts cannot now be doubted. Article III of the
Constitution extends the federal judicial power to "all cases in
law and in equity arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States and Treaties . . . " If there is a federal law
of labor contracts, there is a law for section 3O cases to arise
under. Suppose, however, that Congress by section 301 meant to
2061 Stat. x56 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952).
21 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-I 4 (1952), as amended, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (Supp. IV, 1957).
19571
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leave to state law, where it resided before passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act, the function of defining all of the primary rights
and liabilities falling outside the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board which flow from collective-bargaining con-
tracts.2 2 On the basis of this reading section 301 simply makes the
federal courts available as a forum for the enforcement of state
law. But if that be so, how is federal jurisdiction to be made out
pursuant to the "arising under" clause of article III, as it must be
in the absence of diversity of citizenship? Does article III permit
Congress to lift itself by its own bootstraps and validly grant
jurisdiction which arises under no law of the United States ex-
cept the jurisdictional statute itself? Of course the question is
thus put in its most troublesome form -it can be less provoca-
tively asked- and even as so put it is not unanswerble. But
it is troublesome and provocative enough to place a judge in a
dilemma nicely framed by two canons of statutory construction.
One rule is that constitutional issues are to be avoided by
adopting that construction of a statute which does not raise
them,23 in this instance the construction that the substantive law
to be applied under section 301 is federal. The other canon is
vaguely related to the now disreputable attitude of some early
English and American judges that statutes are excrescences on
the fair body of the common law and are preferably not to be
construed in derogation of it.24 But the relation is of the vaguest,
and there is nothing disreputable about the modern American doc-
trine which refuses to impute to Congress the casual intention to
make vast and far-reaching changes in existing statutory or com-
mon law, especially if the effect is an important alteration in the
federal balance.25 Such is most certainly the effect of section 301
if it is read to create a body of substantive federal law, for if it
does so, it creates an exclusive one.26 No competing state law
"2 See Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts, 48 YAL L.J. 295
(1938).
2 See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. i98 (1956);
United States v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 (i9o9).
24 See PoLLOCK, ESSAYS Ix JURiSPpUDENCE AND ETHICS 84-85 (is&!); Pound,
Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383, 396-403 (x908).
23 See, e.g., Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940).
26 State law would undercut federal uniformity. Furthermore, as is made plain
in Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers, 182 F.2d 8o6 (2d Cir. i95o),
the result would be to subject the primary activities of labor and management to
inconsistent regulations. This cannot be tolerated in a federal system. See Wol-
lett & Wellington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor Agreement, 7 STAN. L. Rlv.
IVol. 71
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could survive under the supremacy clause of the Constitution.
Facing the dilemma we have described, in Association of West-
inghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 7 the
first case concerning section 3O to reach the Supreme Court,
Justices Frankfurter, Burton, and Minton subjected the section
to a forced, indeed it may be thought, to an emasculating read-
ing which enabled them on the facts before them to hold it in-
applicable .2  The Justices obtained the concurrence of a majority
of the Court for their interpretation of the statute, though not
for the forthrightness with which their opinion recognized and
avoided the dilemma the statute created. 9 Having held that
the statute did not cover the case, Westinghouse applied, of
course, neither federal nor state substantive law, though Justices
Frankfurter, Burton, and Minton made it plain that, had it come
to that, they would have held that state law was applicable.
30
The lower federal courts in their turn have dealt with section 301
in numerous cases. Either they have followed the rule command-
ing that they refrain if at all possible from reaching constitu-
tional issues and have held that federal law governs under sec-
tion 3oi,31 or they have resolved the constitutional issue in favor
of the statute's validity, finding it unnecessary to decide whether
federal or state substantive law applies 32 or holding that state
law does.3 3
445, 452 (1955). See also Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F.
Supp. 137, 140 (D. Mass. 1953).27 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
" The case involved a suit by the union for wages allegedly due employees and
withheld in violation of the collective-bargaining agreement. The statute was con-
strued so as not to apply to cases of "grievances based upon an employer's failure
to comply with terms of a collective agreement relating to compensation, terms
peculiar in the individual benefit which is their subject matter and which, when
violated, give a cause of action to the individual employee." Id. at 460.
" The Chief Justice and Justice Clark joined in the result but not in the
reasoning of Justice Frankfurter's opinion. They offered no reasons of their own,
however, to support their construction of § 301. Justice Reed said that as a
matter of contract law the cause of action did not belong to the union. Justice
Douglas, joined by Justice Black, dissented.
3
0 Id. at 441-49.
"' E.g., Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298
(2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957); Wilson & Co. v. United Packing-
house Workers, 83 F. Supp. x62 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
"E.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d
576 (ist Cir. 1956); Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp.
137 (D. Mass. 1953).
3 3 E.g., United Steelworkers v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 323 (7th
19571
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Either conclusion leads, of course, to the question of remedy
which carries its own set of complications. Paradoxically enough,
much the same doctrine which went to create a dilemma in the
choice of substantive law by impelling a judge toward election
of the state law tends to exert its pull in favor of the applicability
of federal law to determine the availability of the remedy and that
regardless of whether a judge has concluded that section 3oi refers
him on substantive issues to state law, or that it establishes the
supremacy of a body of federal law, or that he need not decide
that it does either. For if state law governs on the question of
remedy in the federal courts under section 301, then that statute
has again, in casual because inexplicit fashion, ordained a major
change in existing practice, including a shift in the distribution
of functions between the states and the nation.34 This is so be-
cause it has traditionally been settled that the law of the forum
will determine whether the remedy of specific performance is
available to enforce arbitration promises in any type of contract.
3 5
It would be particularly startling to find this rule abrogated
with respect to collective-bargaining contracts. For, as Judge
Cir. E957); Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Union, 187 F.2d 98o (ioth
Cir. ig5i).
34 Obviously, maintenance of the federal balance will sometimes require the
presumption that state authority was left undisturbed, and sometimes the pre-
sumption that federal power was exerted to the full extent of its reach. The
status quo, which both presumptions seek to preserve against rash or casual en-
croachment, may be objectively determinable as it is on both the substantive and
remedial issues in Lincoln Mills. But its definition may also reflect a judge's own
estimate of what - everything else being equal- the proper division of power and
responsibility should be in a federal system. Compare United Automobile Workers
v. Wisconsin Employment Bd., 35I U.S. 266 (1956), with Pennsylvania v. Nelson,
350 U.S. 497 (1956). In the first case the Court held that a state may enjoin
picketing it deems to be violent, although the applicable federal statute also makes
provisions to deal with precisely the same situation. "The States," said the Court,
"are the natural guardians of the public against violence. . . .We would not in-
terpret an act of Congress to leave them powerless to avert such emergencies with-
out compelling directions to that effect." 351 U.S. at 274-75. In the Nelson case
the Court held that a state sedition act could not survive in view of the existence
of parallel federal legislation. There was here in question, the Court said, quoting
from an earlier case, "'a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system [must] be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject.'" 350 U.S. at 504.
- See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924); Gregory &
Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17 U. Cni. L. REv.
233 (ig5o). The rule has been criticized. See, e.g., Phillips, Arbitration and Con-
flicts of Laws: A Study of Benevolent Compulsion, ig CoR ELL L.Q. 197 (2934).
Its merits, of course, are not here in question.
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Magruder has remarked in a notable opinion,3 6 Congress has
closely restricted the equitable remedial powers of a federal
court in a labor controversy. It has done this principally through
the Norris-LaGuardia Act,3 7 which, for purposes here relevant,
neither section 3oi nor any other part of the Taft-Hartley Act
repeals.18 Indeed, a subsection of section 3oi itself imposes re-
strictive procedural requirements.39 Therefore, in the words of
Judge Magruder, to look to state law "for the availability and
forms of specific enforcement would complicate and hamper the
[federal] district court's observance of the limits Congress has
imposed. That is especially true because the enforceability of
arbitration agreements varies considerably among the states." 40
To this line of argument may be interposed the recent deci-
" Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85 (ist Cir.
1956), aff'd, 353 U.S. 547 ('957).
37 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-Is (1952).
18 W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 217 F.2d 6
(ist Cir. 1954). The strictures of the Norris-LaGuardia Act have been relaxed by
the Taft-Hartley Act in two situations: (i) when the National Labor Relations
Board seeks an injunction to remedy an unfair labor practice, National Labor Re-
lations Act § io(h), as amended, 61 Stat. 149 (i947), 29 U.S.C. § 16o(h) (1952);
(2) when, in a national emergency, the Attorney General petitions a district court
for an injunction against a strike or lockout, Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, § 208(b), 61 Stat. 155, 29 U.S.C. § 178(b) (1952).
" Section 303 (a)' has been set out in text. See p. 7 supra. The remainder of
the section provides:
"(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry af-
fecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities
affect commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents.
Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the
employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judg-
ment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be
enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and
shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
"(c) For the purpose of actions and proceedings by or against labor organiza-
tions in the district courts of the United States, district courts shall be deemed to
have jurisdiction of a labor organization (i) in the district in which such organi-
zation maintains its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its duly author-
ized officers or agents are engaged in representing or acting for employee members.
"(d) The service of summons, subpena, or other legal process of any court
of the United States upon an officer or agent of a labor organization, in his capa-
city as such, shall constitute service upon the labor organization.
"(e) For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is
acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make such other person responsible
for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually
authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling."
40 Local 2o5, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85, 95 (ist
Cir. z956), aff'd, 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
19571
HeinOnline -- 71 Harv. L. Rev. 11 1957
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
sion of the Supreme Court in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
America.4 Despite the traditional rule, the Court in that case
held that where jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizen-
ship the federal forum must, pursuant to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 42
and its extensions, particularly Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,45
follow state law in determining whether to grant a stay pending
arbitration. Under Bernhardt, state law would no doubt be held
to govern the availability in a diversity case of the remedy of
specific performance of a promise to arbitrate.44 But, whether or
not Erie and Guaranty Trust compelled the outcome in Bern-
hardt, neither those decisions nor Bernhardt itself can, without
more, impose like results in cases heard under a grant of federal-
question jurisdiction conferred by section 301, for even if it is
required to apply state substantive law, a court exercising federal-
question jurisdiction is by hypothesis not just another court of
the state in which it sits in the sense in which Erie is said to
render it one in diversity cases.45 By the same token the Court
in Bernhardt put forward, as a persuasive reason for its holding, a
constitutional issue posed by Erie itself: whether Congress has
the power to supplant state law with federal.46 This question
could not arise under section 301, in which, as we have indicated,
the constitutional question is not how much of the applicable law
may be federal, but how little. The constitutional caveat, if it
cuts at all, cuts the other way.
Thus Bernhardt leaves the issue of the remedy under section
3oi where it found it, and a decision to apply federal remedial
law under this section remains indicated. There remain two fur-
ther difficulties, one of which is created by the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. The choice of federal remedial law would have been made to
some extent to comply better with the restrictions of that act.
The effect of the restrictions in a particular case must be dealt
with. A mandatory injunction calling for specific performance of
a contract to arbitrate has been held not to be affected by section
4 of the act,47 which prohibits the courts from enjoining a strike;
41 35o U.S. 198 (1956).
42304 U.S. 64 (1938).
43326 U.S. 99 (1945).
14 This would seem to be the a fortiori case. See The Supreme Court, x955
Term, 7o HARv. L. REv. 83, 138 (1956).
a Cf. Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953).
4 See note ino infra.
4 7 E.g., United Steelworkers v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 323 (7th
EVol 71
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and this may well hold true even if a union's or an employer's
refusal to arbitrate is accompanied by a strike.4 All other cases
growing out of a labor dispute - that is, all cases in which
strikes are not involved -are governed, if at all, by section 7
of the act. Its procedural requirements are complicated and
quite capable of making it impossible to enter a decree of specific
performance of an arbitration promise. The question is whether
they must be complied with for purposes of such a decree.49
The other of the two difficulties is even more serious. A federal
statute must be found authorizing the court to order specific
performance, for at common law no such order could be had in
these circumstances since a promise to arbitrate was revocable. °
State and federal statutes have by and large relaxed this com-
mon-law rigor.5 Section 3oi itself might be deemed such a
statute,52 but it makes not the remotest mention of arbitration
and statutes providing for specific performance of promises to
arbitrate are usually specific and detailed and prescribe proce-
dures to be followed.5" The search is thus directed toward the
United States Arbitration Act of 1925 "' which does meet the
above criteria. However, that act applies by its terms only to
"Cmaritime transactions or a contract evidencing a transaction in-
Cir. i957); Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., ii3 F. Supp. 137
(D. Mass. i953); see Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 HARV.
L. REv. 591, 602-04 (1954). Contra, e.g., International Longshoremen's Union v.
Libby, McNeill & Libby, 114 F. Supp. 249 (D. Hawaii 1953), aff'd per curiam,
221 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. x955).
" See Cox, supra note 47; Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agree-
ments Under Taft-Hartley Section 3ox, 66 YALE L.J. 167, 179-83 (1956).
" There was, in the lower-court cases, a sharp conflict of opinion as to the
application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in suits to enforce labor arbitration agree-
ments. Compare Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137
(D. Mass. 1953, with Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 129
F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1955), rev'd, 233 F.2d 85 (ist Cir. 1956), aff'd, 353 U.S.
547 (1957). See also Mendelsohn, supra note 48, at x79-83.
o5See Gregory & Orlikoff, supra note 35, at 235-38; Sturges & Murphy, Some
Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration
Act, 17 LAW & CONTEMT. PROB. 580, 58I n.2 (1952).
"' In some few cases the rigor has been relaxed without the aid of legislation.
See Sturges & Murphy, supra note 5o, at 582 n.5.
12 Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass.
X953). See also Cox, supra note 47; Mendelsohn, supra note 48.
" Labor arbitration under such statutes is examined in Gregory & Orlikoff,
supra note 35. See also Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts,
83 U. PA. L. Rxv. 16o (1934).
549 U.S.C. §§ 1-I4 (1952).
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volving commerce," 5r and explicitly not to "contracts of em-
ployment of seamen, railway employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 56 Do these
limitations prevent recourse to the Arbitration Act? 5 It is to a
discussion of these problems and their implications that we now
turn.
II. THE PURPOSE OF CONGREss AND THE
FUNCTION OF THE COURT
In the previous section we have attempted to sort out the data,
the given factors that framed the problem in the Lincoln Mills
case as it reached the Supreme Court. Among these data are not
only facts and constitutional and statutory commands but, as is
always true in our legal system, previous adjudications and the
consequences following from them, which may have been general-
ized into rules. These are themselves subject to re-examination
to be sure; nevertheless they do form the setting of a case. No
decision can, of course, be understood out of this context, for
no decision made by a court of professional lawyers can fail
entirely to be conditioned by it, not even one that is rendered by
mere assertion of the result. A decision by assertion has greatly
reduced significance as a part of the next problem's setting, and,
given the value of articulation in the process of reasoning, is more
likely to be ill-advised.
In endeavoring to describe the setting of Lincoln Mills we have
for analytical convenience employed the arbitrary device of
mounting blinkers on a hypothetical judge. We have directed his
attention to the surrounding body of law into which section 3oi
of the Taft-Hartley Act was dropped, but we have not allowed
him to look beyond the words of that statute and of the other
relevant ones. Yet in the American practice he is free,58 and in-
deed in the circumstances of Lincoln Mills he is obliged, to look
559 id. § 2.
56 9 id. § z.
57 The ambiguity of the Arbitration Act has caused the lower federal courts
much difficulty in the field of labor arbitration. For some illustrations of this dif-
ficulty, compare United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co.,
x68 F.2d 33 (4 th Cir. 1948), with Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l
Union, x87 F.2d 98o (roth Cir. igi), and Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United
Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953). The problems are searchingly analyzed
in Cox, supra note 47.
s See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Cormm. L.
REV. 527, 54-44 (1947).
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beyond. At what one may, without intending to deprecate it,
call an elementary stage, the legislative history of a statute is
searched simply for the meaning of words. 9 As almost everyone
knows, words can signify more than one thing.60 At another stage,
the explicit statutory command itself, with all the certain meaning
one can infuse into its words, may be of no help. One is faced with
a specific situation which could be brought within the coverage
of the statute without doing violence to its language but which
cannot with any degree of realism or candor be said to have been
foreseen and provided for by the legislature.61 Judge Learned
Hand in characterizing the way of the judicial process out of this
impasse has written:
When we ask what Congress intended usually there can be no
answer, if what we mean is what any person or group of persons
actually had in mind. Flinch as we may, what we do, and must do,
is to project ourselves, as best we can, into the position of those who
uttered the words, and to impute to them how they would have
dealt with the concrete occasion. He who supposes that he can be
certain of the result is the least fitted for the attempt.
62
The trick is to put Congress in the position of Robert Browning
in a story Mr. Chafee told. Browning received a letter asking
whether cone of his early obscure poems" meant what the writer
11 It is said that when the meaning of language is plain we are not to resort
to evidence in order to raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of experience
than a rule of law and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if
it exists. If Congress has been accustomed to use a certain phrase with a more
limited meaning than might be attributed to it by common practice, it would
be arbitrary to refuse to consider that fact when we come to interpret a statute.
Boston Sand and Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (Holmes, J.).
"0 Underlying the Court's reasoning is the belief that the language of the
1947 amendment is so clear that it would require creative reconstruction ...
[to apply it in a certain fashion]. On more than one occasion, but evidently not
frequently enough, Judge Learned Hand has warned against restricting the
meaning of a statute to the meaning of its "plain" words. "There is no surer
way to misread any document than to read it literally ....... .... Of course
one begins with the words of a statute to ascertain its meaning, but one does
not end with them. The notion that the plain meaning of the words of a
statute defines the meaning of the statute reminds one of T. H. Huxley's gay
observation that at times "a theory survives long after its brains are knocked
out."
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 128, 138 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
81 See Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 381,
400-01 (941); Frankfurter, supra note 58, at 528.
2 United States v. Klinger, igg F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1952), aff'd per curiam,
345 U.S. 979 ('953) ; cf. Cox, supra note 47, at 6o6: "In construing a statute the
judge's function is to project the general congressional will upon specific half-
foreseen, half-understood occasions rather than to enforce his own much wiser
judgments."
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of the letter thought it meant. Browning replied: "I didn't mean
that when I wrote it, but I mean it now." 63
The task of projection and imputation is often a formidable one
of historical reconstruction. The atmosphere which gave birth
to a statute, the needs and agitation which evoked it, must be
sympathetically understood.64 Its purpose, however dimly made
out, must then be translated forward and related to contem-
poraneous or later relevant enactments and to other changes in
the landscape such as the development of new constitutional doc-
trines.65 The judge who, in Judge Learned Hand's phrase, flinches
from this task is necessarily reduced, in the words of Judge Au-
gustus Hand, to employing the "judicial hunch" and to acting
as if it were proper for him to have "everything in his own
hands." 66 The same is true of the judge who falters in the per-
formance of the task and, afflicted with a poverty of patience or
63 See Chafee, supra note 61, at 404.
14 "[LIaws are not abstract propositions. They are-expressions of policy aris-
ing out of specific situations and addressed to the attainment of particular ends.
The difficulty is that the legislative ideas which laws embody are both explicit and
immanent." Frankfurter, supra note 58, at 533; see id. at 537-38; Landis, A Note
on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 -IR.av. L. REv. 886, 891-92 (1930).
65 Translation forward can present very intricate problems when statutes of
long standing, which have acquired a gloss, are in question. The Court may need
to take account of such matters as general reliance on, or approval of, previous
constructions. See FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 37-42 (1949) ;
Lyon, Old Statutes and New Constitution, 44 CoLIJm. L. Rxv. 599 (1944). Compare
Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953), with United States v. Shu-
bert, 348 U.S. 222 (Ig5), and United States v. International Boxing Club, 348
U.S. 236 (i955). See also note 66 infra.
66 Letter from Augustus N. Hand to Louis D. Brandeis, Nov. 21, 1931, in Bran-
deis Papers, on file in (Library of the University of Louisville School of Law.
The judicial function in the construction of statutes is a premise of the legis-
lative process. The extent of the legislature's conscious reliance on the judiciary
will vary of course from case to case. There will always be some. It is a matter of
degree until the point is reached where, in Dean Landis' words, "society and the
legislature both entrust themselves to the law-making powers of courts." Landis,
supra note 64, at 893. But even at that point a judge's freedom should be limited
by the general aim of the statute. And when all indication of purpose ends he
should be guided by maxims of construction commanding harmony with surround-
ing principles of law, or referring him to other decisive considerations. It is never
"in his own hands.'
A most instructive instance of deference to "the law-making powers of courts"
may be found in the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1957. The O'Mahoney
amendment, the compromise that very probably made enactment of the statute
possible, turned on two phrases of art: "civil contempt" and "criminal contempt."
They were not susceptible of thorough definition, and the authors of the statute
knew it. See 5o3 CONG. REc. 11378 (daily ed. July 24, ,957); 103 CONG. REC. 51618
(daily ed. July 26, 1957).
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imagination or empathy loses sight of the distinction between
a purpose which may reasonably be imputed to "those who uttered
the words," and a purpose he himself now holds or would have
held as a legislator. There is the danger in the summons to judi-
cial projection and imputation that some judges will, whether de-
liberately or not, take it as an invitation simply and bluntly to
enforce their own policies or hunches by attributing them to Con-
gress. But the danger is unavoidable, and should be measured
against the certainty that hunch and hunch alone will prevail
if Judge Learned Hand's candid and wise admonition is not fol-
lowed. It will not do to say that one way lies in judicial legisla-
tion, the other in respect for the proper responsibilities of Con-
gress. One way or the other, whether it holds a statute applicable
or not and no matter how it does it, a court decides, and either
way Congress can have the last word if it chooses. There are
times when as a practical matter Congress may be able to act if
the court does one thing but not if it does another.17 This is a
fact of life to be considered but it will not affect the result in the
generality of cases. And in referring to the ability of Congress
to act we allude to conditions imposed by permanent institutional
attributes, not by the passing political configurations of the day.
That the rule of statutory construction formulated by Learned
Hand is capable of achieving some limited results in solving the
cluster of problems raised by Lincoln Mills was demonstrated by
Judge Magruder's opinion in General Elec. Co. v. United Elec.
Workers.18 This is the opinion by Judge Magruder from which we
17 Compare United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(i944), with Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946). In the first of these
cases, the Court held that the insurance business was subject to the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, although at the time of passage of the act insurance was not thought
to be interstate commerce. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) x68 (x869). In
the Cleveland case, the Court confirmed an earlier holding that the Mann Act for-
bade interstate transportation of women not only for purposes of prostitution but
also of polygamy. In theory, neither holding concludes Congress. Actually, it may
realistically be expected that Congress if it chooses will regulate the insurance busi-
ness in some other fashion, or free it of regulation altogether, and thus overrule
the South-Eastern Underwriters case. But can it be thought that any democratically
elected institution in our society is free if it chooses to take action affirmatively to
legalize polygamy? The purpose of the Congress which enacted the Mann Act
being, to say the least, doubtful, was it not true in the Cleveland case that the only
way to leave the last word to Congress was to hold the act inapplicable to polyg-
amy, enabling Congress either to acquiesce or respond in a manner realistically
open to it?
es 244 F.2d 85 (ist Cir. 1956), aff'd, 353 U.S. 547 (1957). This case was one of
the three controlled by the Lincoln Mills decision.
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quoted earlier in this article. In dealing with the difficulties raised
by the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Arbitration Act, Judge
Magruder followed the admonition to place himself in the position
of the legislator. Would the framers of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
have wanted section 7 of that statute to apply to a decree com-
pelling arbitration in light of the plain purpose evinced by section
301 of the Taft-Hartley Act that the federal courts should as a
general proposition have power to hold unions and employers to
promises made in collective-bargaining agreements? A negative
answer was deducible from the fact that the requirements of
section 7 are simply not apt in the circumstances. Section 7 com-
mands the court to make findings which do not fit the situation,
negatively or affirmatively. Yet on no reading does the act ex-
plicitly prohibit a decree of specific performance, as it does forbid
enjoining a strike in section 4. "We do not believe," Judge Ma-
gruder therefore concluded, "[that] Congress intended § 7 in
any case to be a snare and a delusion, holding out the possibility
of jurisdiction but demanding for its exercise sworn allegations
of inapposite facts," 09 a conclusion which would necessarily
follow from a holding that section 7 was applicable.
A like process of reasoning led Judge Magruder to hold the
Arbitration Act applicable. That statute when enacted mani-
fested an intention to exclude from its coverage at least certain
classes of "contracts of employment." The quoted phrase is an
inexact description, if it is a suitable description at all, of the
modern collective-bargaining agreement.70 In any event, the
decisive question is whether coverage would have been extended
to collective-bargaining agreements, which are commonly known
to include arbitration clauses, in the light of the new policy ex-
pressed by section 301 to make such agreements enforceable in
the federal courts. 7 ' The likely answer is yes. Again, the Arbi-
tration Act speaks of "transactions involving commerce." It does
1 Id. at 92. Furthermore, precedent exists, and was cited in the opinion, for
the proposition that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not withdraw all injunc-
tive relief. See Syres v. Oil Workers Union, 350 U.S. 892, reversing 223 F.2d
737 (i955) ; Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949).
See also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30
('957).
"0 Cf. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334-35 (1944).
71 "And so the significance of an enactment, . . . its relation to other enact-
ments, all may be relevant to the construction .. . . Some words are confined to
their history; some are starting points for history." Frankfurter, supra note 58, at
537.
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not force language to place a collective-bargaining agreement in
such a category, in view of the enlarged constitutional meaning
of the word "commerce." 72
This far a disciplined insight into congressional purposes can
carry one in Lincoln Mills. The problem of the remedy may be
solved in this fashion. But on the basic issue of the substantive
law to be employed under section 301, this method of construc-
tion will not point the way to a decision.7 3 Evoke as one may the
full context of the Taft-Hartley Act, study as best one can the
legislative debates which attended its enactment, yet there is no
significant indication of purpose beyond the will to make parties
to a labor contract suable and to hold them to their obligations; 74
there is little if any guidance on the question of what law should
define those obligations. This being so, the dilemma which was
posed before examination of the legislative history remains un-
resolved. And the problem therefore calls for a balancing of the
gravity of the constitutional issue raised by referring to state law
against the damage to the fabric of federalism that would be
caused by a holding that federal law applies. Since the prevailing
and in our view sound opinion is that section 301 is constitutional,
adoption of state law is, we think, in order.7 5
This is not to suggest that any thoughtful student would make
light of this issue or that it can reasonably be resolved in only
one way. In the final analysis the question is this: In exercising
its now vast powers under the commerce clause or indeed any of
its established powers must Congress, before it is free to employ
the federal-court system for the effectuation of its object, go the
full length of displacing state substantive law? 76 To put it an-
other way, instead of achieving uniformity by imposing its own
7 2 For an examination of the conflicting opinions in the courts on the applica-
tion of the Arbitration Act to labor agreements, and an examination of the minus-
cule and ambiguous legislative history on this question, see General Elec. Co. v.
United Elec. Workers, 233 F.2d 85, 97-ioo (ist Cir. 1956), aff'd, 353 U.S. 547
(ig57); Cox, supra.note 47.
71 Cf. Mendelsohn, supra note 48, at 184.
71 See H.R. REP. No. 245, Soth Cong., ist Sess. 6, 45 (1947); Wollett & Welling-
ton, Federalism and Breach of the Labor Agreement, 7 STAw. L. REv. 445, 472-
75 (1955). The legislative history is collected in the appendix to Justice Frank-
furter's dissent in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 485-546
(I957).
71 Even if a holding of unconstitutionality became unavoidable, the extensive
effect on federalism might lead us to the same conclusion.
7 See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 224-25 (1948).
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law may not Congress, hoping for harmony and orchestration
though expecting and desiring some continuing diversity, hand the
conductor's baton to the federal courts rather than giving them a
set of cymbals with which to drown out all other sounds? The
figure is complex and perhaps it has run away with the thought
it is meant to express. The point is simply that providing a forum
for the enforcement of state law in a field which Congress could
occupy is itself a species of regulation, a way of seeking a degree
of uniformity while leaving the maximum room for the exercise
of initiative by the states. It is a way of striving for a measure of
co-ordination by consent and persuasion - a way of setting up
something like a clearing house of ideas - for in following state
law the federal-court system, even if subjected almost to the
stringencies that have been drawn from Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,77
is bound to make some creative contribution despite the fact that
state courts remain theoretically free to resist federal guidance. 78
Since the federal circuits do influence each other and operate
under a single Supreme Court, this contribution in turn is bound
to tend in the direction of harmonizing state policies. We are
dealing by hypothesis with matters of at least potential federal
concern and so the tendency to harmonize will be more pro-
nounced than it has been in the diversity jurisdiction subsequent
to Erie. It is likely to be particularly pronounced where, as in
labor matters, the state substantive law exists only interstitially
anyway and is not often brought to bear free of the influence of
federal law on which the federal courts speak authoritatively."
It would be most regrettable if a federal constitution forbade
the general government to exercise its regulatory powers in this
forebearing, sanguine, and initially perhaps experimental manner
which turns to account the genius of a federal system. It would
7 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
71 See HART & WECHSLER, THm FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 628-
30 (1953); Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 5o YALs LJ. 762, 775-76
(1941).
7o Section 8 enumerates unfair labor practices; these may in some instances
become relevant to the validity or interpretation of a collective agreement.
Certain procedural safeguards are placed about the collective bargaining agree-
ment: an obligation to confer in good faith on questions arising under it; a
duty to follow certain steps prior to terminating or modifying the agreement
unilaterally. (§§ 8(d), 204(a) (2).) And a limited number of substantive
rights conferred under the Act may incidentally involve the interpretation of
the collective agreement. (E.g., § 9(a).)
Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348
U.S. 437, 443 n.2 (1955). See also International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. W. L.
Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576, 581-82 (ist Cir. 1956).
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be regrettable for Congress to be forced instead to exert its au-
thority to the full in order to be able to employ it at all. Is this
the effect of article III of our Constitution? The answer would
be yes if it were true that to allow for federal-question jurisdiction
in cases arising only under a jurisdictional statute is in effect to
eliminate the "arising-under" clause of the Constitution as a
limitation on federal jurisdiction. It is inadmissible to construe
article III so as to provide generally for the sort of jurisdiction
which the framers provided for in cases of diversity of citizen-
ship only.80 But there is no occasion here to obliterate the dis-
tinction between the diversity of citizenship and the "arising-
under" clauses of article III. The "arising-under" clause, if our
view is accepted, can still come into play only when one of the
enumerated heads of legislative powers enables Congress to act.
If a considerable slice of state law can thus be brought into federal
forums regardless of the citizenship of the parties, although in
the conditions of earlier times that would have been possible only
in the diversity jurisdiction, the reason is simply the general ex-
pansion of the area of federal interest and competence. It is no
more shocking to observe this development in article III than in
the commerce clause and indeed, as we have suggested, permitting
it to take place in article III conduces to an abatement of the in-
roads of this expansion's other manifestations on the federal sys-
tem. It remains only to add that for purposes of upholding section
301 of the Taft-Hartley Act a more limited argument than the
one we have put forward will also suffice. It rests on the exercise,
since Osborn v. Bank of the United States,81 of what has come to
be known as protective federal jurisdiction. This jurisdiction is
supported by considerations similar to the ones we have arrayed
without, perhaps, the need of carrying them as far as we have
done.82 The precedents are not numerous but they are persuasive;
80 It remains, in this view, article III which enables Congress to confer judicial
powers on the federal courts, although the "arising-under" clause is to be read in
conjunction with the definition in article I of an area of federal authority. No
implication need arise that such a provision of article III as that limiting the ex-
ercise of judicial power to cases and controversies can be overridden. None of the
underlying issues can be said to have been resolved, of course, by the divided
Court in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
81 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
82 See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d
576 (ist Cir.), cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956); Textile Workers Union v. Ameri-
can Thread Co., IX3 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1933); HART & WECHiSLER, THE FEDERAL
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indeed, they are not easy to avoid.8 3
We are thus led to what for us is the heart of the Lincoln Mills
case. Suppose a judge concludes that he must not give a restric-
tive interpretation, of far-reaching consequences, to the "arising-
under" clause of article III and that section 301 is therefore con-
stitutional. Suppose that, with Judge Magruder, he holds that
federal law is applicable on the issue of the remedy and finds no
obstacles in the Norris-LaGuardia Act and in the Arbitration Act.
Has he solved the Lincoln Mills case and must he then, conform-
ably with the relevant state substantive law, order specific per-
formance? In our view the answer is no. The analysis so far has
served only to uncover the decisive issue, which concerns the
nature of the task section 3oi would impose on the federal courts.
Whether state or federal substantive law is, to use the phrase
we have been employing up to now, applicable under section 3oi,
very little of it will be found in statutory form and hardly any of
that will give more than very general guidance.8 4 Yet particular
problems will, of course, continually arise. The draftsmen of
collective-bargaining contracts are not supermen endowed with
total foresight anymore than are the draftsmen of ordinary con-
tracts and the typical case is not likely to involve a stubborn
refusal to carry out admitted obligations but rather a dispute con-
cerning what those obligations are.85 What section 3oi really
demands of the federal courts, therefore, is not the application
but the creation in case after case, with the scant assistance of
bits and pieces of statutory commands, of a law of labor con-
tracts the chief source of which is to be the common law of com-
mercial contracts.88 The plain fact is that the courts are enor-
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 733-47 (1953); Mishkin, The Federal "Question"
in the District Courts, 53 CoLrs. L. REv. 157, 184-96 ('953).
8 See Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947); Schumacher v. Beeler, 293
U.S. 367 (1934). These cases concern federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.
84 See note 79 supra, for an adumbration of the fashion in which federal statu-
tory law will be relevant. In some states, Wisconsin for example, breach of a col-
lective-bargaining agreement is an unfair labor practice. Employment Peace Act,
Wis. STAT. §§ ixi.o6(i) (f), (2) (c) (1955).
11 Consider the problem in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Eec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955), the first § 301 ease in the Supreme
Court. The dispute involved the interpretation of the agreement. The union, in
good faith, asserted that the company owed its employees wages for a day when
they had not worked. The company, equally in good faith, denied the allegation.
88 Other sources - arbitration reports and labor board decisions - may occa-
sionally be germane, and courts at times will resort to them. See International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 23o F.2d 576, 584 (ist Cir.),
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mously unequal to the task 8 7 and its imposition on them is there-
fore capable of damaging their usefulness for the essential duties
that they are suited to perform.
In supporting this statement we may start with what is perhaps
the broadest and most debatable proposition, debatable although
it has behind it the authority and unique experience of Dean Harry
Shulman, and inferentially the support of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter. In his Holmes Lecture, delivered shortly before his death,
Dean Shulman contended, if we read him correctly, that under no
circumstances can judicial intervention be helpful when labor
arbitration has broken down. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent-
ing opinion in Lincoln Mills quotes a passage from Dean Shul-
man's lecture which makes the point:
The arbitration is an integral part of the system of [industrial] self-
government. And the system is designed to aid management in its
quest for efficiency, to assist union leadership in its participation
cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 (I956); cf. note 84 supra. However, experience teaches
that it is the common law of commercial contracts out of which a common law of
labor contracts will develop.
And this is unfortunate. "In my judgment it is a mistake to attempt to force
agreements between labor unions and employers into . . . familiar legal pigeonholes
such as usage, third party beneficiary contracts, or contracts negotiated by the
union as agent for the employees as principals." Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agree-
ment, 69 HARV. L. RaV. 6O, 604 (1956). At common law, the courts always have
had difficulty with the collective-bargaining agreement. "Some courts have called
it a mere gentlemen's agreement, unenforceable at law; and the treaty analogy is
still made." Gregory, The Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Nature and Scope,
1949 WAsir. U.L.Q. 3, I. To cope with the collective agreement, an agency theory
has been advanced, see, e.g., Barnes & Co. v. Berry, 169 Fed. 225 (6th Cir. I9O9) ;
and a third-party-beneficiary doctrine has been employed, see, e.g., Blum & Co. v.
Landau, 23 Ohio App. 426, 155 N.E. X54 (1926). "A substantial body of case law,
both in this country and abroad, has dealt with collective agreements according to
the traditional pattern of contract litigation." LABOR REI.ATioNs AND THE LAW
308 (Mathews ed. X953). See also Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in Ameri-
can Law, 44 HARv. L. RaV. 572 (r93i); Lenhoff, The Present Status of Col-
lective Contracts in the American Legal System, 39 MIcH. L. Rav. Ir09 (941);
Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts, 48 YALE L.J. 95 (1938).
87 Consider the difficulty which Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 348 U.S. 437 (z955),
caused the Third Circuit, the highest federal court to dispose of the case as a matter
of labor-contract law. After theorizing about the nature of a collective-bargaining
agreement (and floundering badly), the court held, in a 4-3 decision, that "the em-
ployer's duty to pay a certain rate arises out of the collective bargaining contract
plus the sanctions of the labor relations Act. The duty to pay a particular employee
wages in the sum resulting from such rate arises out of the individual contract of
hire. The latter is the duty alleged here, and, therefore, Section 301 (a) is not in-
volved since there is no violation of a contract between an employer and a labor or-
ganization." Id. at 630.
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in the enterprise, and to secure justice for the employees. It is a
means of making collective bargaining work and thus preserving
private enterprise in a free government. When it works fairly well,
it does not need the sanction of the law of contracts or the law of
arbitration. It is only when the system breaks down completely
that the courts' aid in these respects is invoked. But the courts
cannot, by occasional sporadic decision, restore the parties' con-
tinuing relationship; and their intervention in such cases may
seriously affect the going systems of self-government. When their
autonomous system breaks down, might not the parties better be
left to the usual methods for adjustment of labor disputes rather
than to court actions on the contract or on the arbitration award? 88
Justice Frankfurter reinforced this passage with the following
observations:
Arbitration agreements are for specific terms, generally much
shorter than the time required for adjudication of a contested law-
suit through the available stages of trial and appeal. Renegotia-
tion of agreements cannot await the outcome of such litigation;
nor can the parties' continuing relation await it. Cases under § 301
will probably present unusual rather than representative situations.
A "rule" derived from them is more likely to discombobulate than
to compose. A "uniform corpus" cannot be expected to evolve,
certainly not within a time to serve its assumed function.
8 9
Courts, no matter how closely confined to the detailed provi-
sions of a legislative code, and perhaps even courts reviewing in
the normal fashion the actions of administrative agencies, would
always fall under the strictures of the statements we have quoted.
But the point need not be pressed quite so relentlessly in order to
condemn section 3o. For that statute enacts no code, relies on
none, and interposes no body of experts. It gives carte blanche,
making the courts arbiters-in-chief of collective-bargaining con-
tracts. Yet a half-century of often painful and disagreeable ex-
perience cries aloud that labor problems emphasize most dra-
matically the limitations of the judicial process as an instrument
for the formulation of social policy. It is not likely that the com-
mon law of contracts will prove a more fitting source of rules to
bridle the forces of labor unrest than the common law of property
or the common or Sherman Act law of unfair competition, on
88 Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAMw. L. REv.
999, 1024 (1g55). The passage was quoted in 353 U.S. at 463 (dissenting opinion).
89 353 U.S. at 463-64 (dissenting opinion).
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which the courts have drawn in the past.90 The point is not that
the courts will make what in political parlance would be called
antilabor rules because courts tend to be conservative, or that
they will now be antimanagement because so many of our federal
judges were appointed by prolabor administrations. There will
be some prolabor and some antilabor policies made and it is true
that the political choice between the contending interests, which
such policies represent, belongs with officials reachable at the
polls, not with judges. But beyond that the point is that the courts
will draw from a body of experience not germane to the problem
they will face. Given their limited means of informing them-
selves and the episodic nature of their efforts to do so, they will
only dimly perceive the situations on which they impose their
order. Even if they do perceive, they will necessarily come too
late with a pound of "remedy" where the smaller measure of pre-
vention was needed. Their rules, tailored to the last bit of trouble,
will never catch up with the next and different dispute. They will
allow or forbid and be wrong in either event, because continuous,
pragmatic, and flexible regulation alone can help. They will on
most occasions naturally shy away from basing their judgments
on what they are accustomed to regard as "political" factors in-
compatible with their disinterestedness, although these may form
the only sensible context of questions before them. And they
will thus find themselves resting judgment on trivia or irrelevan-
cies. All this will not only, by its sheer volume, divert the energies
of the courts from their proper sphere but will also tend to bring
the judicial process into disrepute by exposing it as inadequate
to a task with which it should never have been entrusted.91
90 See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 368 (i92i) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Cox, CASES ON LABOR LAW 8-84 (3d ed. 1954); FRANIURTER & GREEnE, THE
LABOR INJUNCTION 1-46 (1930).
91 The effect on the courts of broad mandates to make law has recently drawn
comment from former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Referring to part III
of the Civil Rights Bill which was struck by Senate amendment from the Civil
Rights Act of 1957, Mr. Acheson has written:
For Congress to have directed the executive branch to enforce these incom-
prehensible statutes would not have advanced civil rights. It would have pro-
duced endless litigation and given a perfect excuse to avoid any further legis-
lation which experience may show to be necessary. Worse than this, it would
have invited the court to legislate, as all sloppy and vague acts of Congress re-
quire it to do, and then, when it does state the law - as it must - bring down
upon it the condemnation of large sections of the community. This sort of
Congressional irres onsibility can cdo vast harm to the judicial branch and to
confidence in it. -The S-enateamen lments avoid all this.
Acheson, A Word of Praise, The Reporter, Sept. 5, 1957, P. 8; cf. Pound, Common
Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383, 403-04 (I908).
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We have endeavored to make the point as vigorously as we
could. There are, of course, things to be said on the other side.
State courts have engaged in this business. Thus there is some
law to be found beyond that of commercial contracts. All courts
already deal with other matters for which all or most of what we
said also holds. They make antitrust law under statutes not very
much more explicit for the conditions of this day than section 301.
The suitability of the common law of contracts, for example, for
governing major modern commercial transactions is subject to
serious doubt. All this may be thought to argue no more than
that section 301 would not create unprecedented troubles but
would merely add to existing ones. In any event, we need to
demonstrate for our purposes only that a reasonable man, though
there are those who might think him wrong, could be disturbed
by what he deemed the gravely unwise allocation of institutional
functions made by section 301; that he could sensibly arrive at
the conviction that the wrong task was given to the wrong institu-
tion, and that the consequences are likely to be serious all around.
Our question is, if the reasonable man is a Justice of the Supreme
Court and if the Lincoln Mills case is before him, can that con-
viction properly be decisive for him in the disposition of the case?
And our answer is yes - that conviction and no other. It was the
function of the Court in Lincoln Mills to come to grips with this
issue and to form its conviction.
We should make clear at once that this institutional issue, as
one might well term it, is quite distinct from the sort of question
of policy Congress dealt with in passing section 3o and the rest
of the Taft-Hartley Act.9 2 What is necessary and wise for our
economy in regulating the relations of labor and management?
Who is acquiring too much political power and should he be cut
down to size? Who is getting too much or too little of a share out
of the wealth we produce? Such is the cast of the problems Con-
gress resolves and we would not for a moment contend that it is
the function of judges to be concerned with them. Indeed, it is
one of the unfortunate features of section 301 that it leaves many
such problems unresolved and attempts to thrust them upon the
attention of the courts. Congress must answer such questions,
and when it does it is for the courts faithfully to enforce the
92 See generally Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act,
x947, 6z HAv. L. Rxv. 1, 274 (1947-48).
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answers, divining them when necessary by the rule of statutory
construction formulated by Judge Learned Hand. But there are
solutions the legislature may adopt for problems properly in its
sphere which on analysis turn out to be enmeshed in other issues
and to be fraught with consequences above and beyond those that
Congress had in view. Of this truism, section 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act is a classic illustration. And its legislative history is
a textbook demonstration of the further truism that Congress
cannot normally be expected to have confronted such an institu-
tional issue as we have outlined and to have formed a deliberate
opinion about it.
Not only does the legislative history of section 301 fail to indi-
cate with assurance if the courts are to draw on state or federal
law as a source of substantive rules, but there is not the faintest
trace of recognition of the complexity of the task delegated to the
courts, or of concern with their suitability for it. 3 It is clear that
Congress meant to redress the balance of power and benefits be-
tween labor and management, and in many instances the Taft-
Hartley Act strikes very nice new balances 4 But section 301
represents only the feeling that application of contract law by the
courts would serve a like end. There was no awareness of any-
thing else. There is unlikely to be such an awareness in a body
constituted and occupied as Congress is, and responding quite
properly to the pressures of those it is responsible to. The popular
voice which expresses without inhibition what is wanted in the
way of immediate, palpable results should be heard somewhere
and Congress is that place. But Congress cannot normally be
expected also to be aware that some of the means chosen to
achieve immediate ends impinge in not easily apparent fashion on
values of permanent significance. Were this not so the Constitu-
tion, which embodies such values (and not least among them
principles of the recognition of institutional capabilities), could
be left to the care of Congress alone. But the Supreme Court also
guards it and draws from it what is enduring. We contend that,
by the same token, other values not enshrined in the Constitution
but existing in its penumbra and akin to constitutional ones (and
like them not to be judged in terms of the choice of temporal
policies that is for Congress alone to make) are also entrusted
11 See authorities cited notes 73, 74 supra.
" See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, z947, 61
HAv. L. REv. 1, 24-34, 274, 291-99 (1947-48).
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to the guardianship of the Court. They are no doubt somewhat
lower on the scale of timeless importance and the Court therefore
does not have the power to decree without recourse that they must
be vindicated at all costs or even to define their content with
finality. But it is for the Court to bring them to the fore so that
they may receive their due weight in Congress as they are other-
wise most unlikely to do.
Whether or not we are justified in generalizing as we have,
there is one such value that recommends itself most fittingly to
the Supreme Court's attention, and it is the value threatened by
section 3oi. What is involved here is the institutional capability
of the Supreme Court and the system of federal courts over which
it presides. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter points out in his dissent
in Lincoln Mills, the principles of article III of the Constitution
make rather special claim to the Court's guardianship. He states:
The earliest declaration of unconstitutionality of an act of Con-
gress - by the Justices on circuit - involved a refusal by the Jus-
tices to perform a function imposed upon them by Congress because
of the non-judicial nature of that function. . . . Since then, the
Court has many times declared legislation unconstitutional because
it imposed on the Court powers or functions that were regarded as
outside the scope of the "judicial power" lodged in the Court by the
Constitution ...
One may fairly generalize from these instances that the Court
has deemed itself peculiarly qualified, with due regard to the con-
trary judgment of Congress, to determine what is meet and fit for
the exercise of "judicial power" as authorized by the Constitution.95
We have no doubt, as we have explained, that section 3oi con-
fers powers that are "meet and fit" by constitutional criteria. The
issue we have raised is not of constitutional proportions, but it
is nevertheless one the Court is "peculiarly qualified" to determine
though not with the finality it would speak with on a constitu-
tional matter. And we believe it can be shown that Justices of the
Court and -though it tended to pour the heady wine into old
bottles - the Court as a whole, have in the past thought them-
selves so qualified.
What, after all, was the ultimate basis of dissent by Justices
who opposed the application of the Sherman Act to labor disputes
and the application to those disputes of general jurisdictional
95 353 U.S. at 464-65 (dissenting opinion).
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statutes, the common law of property and the like? It would
preposterously mistake the judicial philosophy of a Brandeis, and
ignore what he wrote in cases of this sort, to suppose that he was
at one with the majority in a cheerful desire to make social and
economic policy and differed only about the particular policy
that should be made. Brandeis believed and said that it was not
the business of judges to enunciate such policy. Again, it was
not application of Judge Learned Hand's rule of statutory con-
struction, of which he was a masterful practitioner, that was
decisive for Brandeis. The decisive factor was Brandeis' view of
the functions that could properly be allocated to courts,"6 for
the imputation of purpose to the framers of the Sherman Act, and
even of the Clayton Act, led to ambiguity and perhaps even to
the same result as such an imputation of purpose to section 3o.
7
In Brandeis' philosophy the labor cases were of a piece with such
a case as International News Serv. v. Associated Press.9 s He
resisted in that case the admittedly reasonable, indeed enlightened
and proper, formulation of a common-law rule to prevent the
pirating of news. He resisted not because he disagreed with the
rule or thought it unauthorized but because he was convinced that
in formulating it the Court was assuming a task it would prove
unfit to discharge. He saw the problem of the protection of news
as one that demanded the imposition of a rule of law, just as he
believed that above the rights of labor combatants "rises duty to
the community" 9 which should be defined by law. But in Asso-
ciated Press as in the labor cases he saw the problem in its full
and real dimensions and he recognized it as not "meet and fit"
for solution by the judicial process.'00
Of course, it may be said that if there is one thing that is plain
about section 301 it is the very thing that was cloudy about the
Sherman Act: that is the specific intention of Congress to em-
power the courts to make labor law, to have them do what they
can constitutionally be required to do though they may think it
11 See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488 (1921) (dis-
senting opinion); cf. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 31I (1926).
17 See GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 170-72 (rev. ed. 1949).
98 248 U.S. 215 (1918); see id. at 262-67 (dissenting opinion).
" Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488 (1921) (dissenting
opinion).
100 See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 618--24 (923) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); Freund, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in MR. JUSTICE 97, 113-15 (Dunham &
Kurland ed. 1956).
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unsuitable. Here therefore we would ask a judge not just to in-
cline, for the reasons we have set forth, toward one of two possible
readings of the legislative will - even though it be the less likely
one -but to flout that will when it is unmistakable. But we
would not have the Court do anything that is incompatible with
a decent respect for the English language. The result must be
containable in the words of the statute. What is more important,
the legislative history of section 30 does not, any more than does
that of the Sherman Act, reveal any awareness of the institutional
issue. That issue is decisive (in the Court's view, to be sure, not
in the view Congress first took) and on that there is no flouting of
any considered congressional purpose.
Consider, as embodying a notion of the judicial function very
much like the one we set forth here, the traditional doctrine that
Congress will not be deemed to have ordained a major change
in the legal status quo, especially a change in the federal balance,
unless it is inescapably clear that it has done so.101 Judge Learned
Hand's method of imputation of purpose, which proceeds in terms
of the policy choices Congress did make and the kind of concrete
results it wanted and would have wanted, might often lead in most
satisfactory fashion to a solution quite contrary to that reached
by the above-mentioned doctrine." 2 Yet it is that doctrine that
prevails so long as it is reasonably apparent that Congress had its
101 See, e.g., Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940). See also note 34
supra.
102 "[I]n the interpretation of recent regulatory statutes, .. .the judicial task
... is one of accommodation as between assertions of new federal authority and
historic functions of the individual states. Federal legislation of this character
cannot therefore be construed without regard to the implications of our dual sys-
tem of government. . . .The underlying assumptions of our dual form of govern-
ment, and the consequent presuppositions of legislative draftsmanship which are ex-
pressive of our history and habits, cut across what might otherwise be the implied
range of legislation.' Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,
47 CoL m. L. Rav. 527, 539-40 (1947). (Emphasis added.) A recent occasion
when the Court put this lucidly stated principle into practice is United Automobile
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956); see note
34 supra. The Taft-Hartley Act made the behavior involved in that case a union
unfair labor practice, and empowered the National Labor Relations Board to deal
with it. It would have been natural, and in line with the Court's general doc-
trine in the field, to hold that state authority had thus been displaced- natural but
for the fact that the state authority here asserted was part of "the historic func-
tions of the individual states." Cf. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnam Constr.
Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954). But cf. United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Floor-
ing Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956).
Other, less recent cases can be cited in which it is evident that, had considera-
tions of the federal balance not impinged, the federal regulatory statute in question
would have received a generous construction, extending the general legislative pur-
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eye - as it did in passing section 301 - on results and not on
the havoc it might wreak in achieving them. It is for the Court
in such cases to give pause, not to invoke constitutional pro-
hibitions, but to give a chance for a better-informed second
thought. That is what the doctrine means.
The rule that a statute is to be interpreted so as to avoid con-
stitutional doubts is another commonly applied canon of statutory
construction that serves in many cases as a screen behind which
the Court in fact performs the function we are describing. When
those doubts are seriously entertained and are of major propor-
tions the rule rests on reasons of its own "03 which have little to
do with what may inoffensively be described as the function of
remanding legislation to Congress for a new look. The rule was
very aptly applied in the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for
whom, as we shall see, section 301 posed a very real constitutional
question, in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp."°4 But not infrequently the doubts in
a judge's mind are of a different sort. It is not that if he goes in
one direction he must scale the mountain of the Constitution; it
is only that he will reach the foothills. The constitutional foot-
hills are the sort of issue we are talking about and the judge who
pose to unforeseen but apt situations, which are within the reach of its language.
Not least among them is Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), the
case that, at last, construed the Sherman Act as being directed chiefly at com-
mercial practices tending toward monopolization and as not authorizing the judici-
ary to deal with incidental obstructions of commerce resulting from industrial
strife. Chief Justice Hughes, in dissent, demonstrated rather convincingly how the
normal-and normally enlightened -method of construction would lead to the
opposite result. Id. at 514. But "the maintenance in our federal system," said
Justice Stone for the Court, "of a proper distribution between state and national
governments of police authority and of remedies private and public for public
wrongs is of far-reaching importance. An intention to disturb the balance is not
lightly to be imputed to Congress." Id. at 513. It is particularly significant that
Justice Stone wrote in the Apex case, for, as he noted, Congress had been asked,
and had declined repeatedly, to reverse the Court's holdings in previous labor
cases under the Sherman Act. Id. at 488. Normally, such silent acquiescence by
Congress was decisive for Justice Stone. See Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S.
61, 7o (1946) (Stone, C. J., dissenting).
103 [U]ness this rule be considered as meaning that our duty is to first de-
cide that a statute is unconstitutional and then proceed to hold that such
ruling was unnecessary because the statute is susceptible of a meaning, which
causes it not to be repugnant to the Constitution, the rule plainly must mean
that where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which
grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which
such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.
United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U.S.
366, 408 (i9o9). (Emphasis added.)
104 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
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allows them to govern his construction of a statute performs the
function we are talking about. We hesitate to mention any specific
considerations, beyond those raised by section 301, which might
properly call forth exercise of this function because the function
has its obvious dangers (as does the method of statutory construc-
tion by projection and imputation, and as does most strikingly
the very power to declare legislation unconstitutional) and its
extension should be undertaken with great care. Yet there is at
least one recent example of the exercise by the Court in matters
quite unlike section 301 of what must be the function we have
put forward, albeit the words in which the performance took place
were the words of avoidance of constitutional decision. (It should
be added that the words were lightly and quickly intoned.)
The Court was dealing with the liberties of aliens- persons
who are not represented in the political process and to whose rights
the Court might well be particularly alert though one can scarcely
maintain that it has always been so. Aliens do have certain con-
stitutional rights but, in view of the vast powers over them that
Congress possesses and in view of the adjudications of the past
dozen years or so,1°5 the right that was claimed in United States
v. Witkovich 106 was at best shrubbery in the constitutional foot-
hills. Congress had required aliens against whom deportation
orders were outstanding to give under oath information about
their "habits, associations, and activities, and such other informa-
tion, whether or not related to the foregoing, as the Attorney
General may deem fit and proper." 117 The Court, very com-
mendably we think, held that only information which was relevant
to the Government's concern that the alien remain available for
deportation could be elicited. Normal canons of construction of
a statute obviously aimed at imposing severe and comprehensive
controls would have led to the opposite and harsher result. And
the Court was not able to argue convincingly that the construction
the Government was contending for might lead to a holding of
unconstitutionality. Was not the Court remanding to Congress
105 E.g., Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (I956); Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952);
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
106353 U.S. 194 (i957). One need not agree with the extreme constitutional
holdings of the cases cited in the preceding footnote in order to take the view that
the Witkovilh case, though exhibiting a great deal of offensive congressional harsh-
ness, does not raise a serious constitutional issue.
107 66 Stat. 211 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (Supp. IV, 1957).
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what on paper might have looked like severities but in practice
became barbarities and asking the Congress to reconsider the
necessity of going quite so far in the exercise of its undoubted
power to make the nation secure against dangerous or unwanted
aliens? This was not, as in section 301, an institutional issue
touching its own capabilities, which issue the Court is peculiarly
fitted to deal with. Nor was the issue that was decisive for the
Court here properly speaking a by-product of the result Congress
aimed at. It was not a consequence of congressional action which
Congress plainly did not have its eye on and could not be brought
to care about unless the Court directed its attention to it. Both
Congress and the Court would appear this time to have dealt
with approximately the same range of considerations. Both
balanced the needs of security, which by and large it is for Con-
gress, not the Court, to assess, against regard for the individual's
privacy. This decision is therefore, if we characterize it correctly
(and we do so partly on the basis of surmise of course), an exten-
sion of what we have called the remanding function. 08 But it is
108 Cf. United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1956). This, a somewhat differ-
ent case, involved the preliminaries to proceedings looking to denaturalization of
a citizen. A restrictive construction of the statute had the concurrence in this
case of a unanimous Court.
The Witkovich and Minker cases have honorable dissenting antecedents. These
stand, it seems to us, in a relation to Witkovich and Minker which is the same as
the relation of the dissent in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,
479 (ig2I), to the view we take of Lincoln Mills. It was held in United States
v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929), that in requiring applicants for naturalization
to be "attached to the principles of the Constitution," and to swear to "support
and defend the Constitution . . . against all enemies, foreign and domestic,"
Congress meant to exclude from naturalization one who would not bear arms for
reasons of conscience. Rebelling against the narrow-mindedness of this construction
and invoking the spirit of our institutions- what we have, perhaps ungraciously,
called the constitutional foothills -Justice Holmes, joined by Justice Brandeis,
dissented. Justice Holies did not contend that the Court's construction was not a
possible one, and he did not suggest the presence of a constitutional issue. When
a very similar holding, based on the same statutory language, was handed down
in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 6o5 (193), Chief Justice Hughes wrote
for the dissenters, who now included also Justice Stone. The Chief Justice expressly
set constitutional issues to the side. The "authority of Congress to exact a promise
to bear arms as a condition of its grant of naturalization" might, he said, "for
the present purpose . . . be assumed." The question was one of construction. "I
think," the Chief Justice wrote, "that the requirement [to bear arms] should not
be implied, because such a construction is directly opposed to the spirit of our
institutions and to the historic practice of the Congress . . . . If such a promise is
to be demanded, contrary to principles which have been respected as fundamental,
the Congress should exact it in unequivocal terms." Id. at 627-28. The parallel
seems to us unmistakable. The dissenters in Schwimmer and Macintosh went against
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justifiable on two grounds: First, Congress did fix its attention,
almost in a state of self-hypnosis, on the needs of security and
it did so in dealing with people who have no political representa-
tion and who thus fall into a special category. Second, the Court
saw the provision not abstractly but after it had been put in prac-
tice and could thus note aspects of it hidden to the eye of Con-
gress. This second will generally be true but it is of greater force
here in conjunction with the first-mentioned consideration.
If the articulation of penumbral constitutional questions which
the Court would, if pressed, have to decide in favor of the legis-
lation is a traditional way of performing the "remanding" func-
tion, why does this technique not suffice for all necessary pur-
poses, for the issues calling for an exercise of the "remanding"
function will always be close to, but not quite, constitutional
ones? Lincoln Mills demonstrates the answer. The way to avoid
the constitutional problem there is to hold that federal substan-
tive law applies."0 9 Yet that solution, which is the logical conse-
quence of the articulation of the constitutional issue, does not
solve the institutional problem we have posed. Or a judge may
feel compelled to decide the constitutional issue. That course, if
our view is correct, leaves the problem unsolved. Moreover, in
any case the invocation of constitutional doubts is too drastic a
way of forcibly calling something to the attention of Congress.
The point after all is to ask Congress for sober reconsideration,
leaving to Congress the last word. To raise constitutional doubts
is to inhibit future legislative action. It is to achieve an un-
necessarily unsettling effect by rattling the saber of the Court's
ultimate authority." ° A candid avowal that a matter the impli-
cations of which Congress failed to see is being sent back for a
second reading, so to speak, is much more compatible with due
a permissible, perhaps even the likely, construction, just as did Brandeis in opposing
application of the Sherman Act to labor controversies. The Court in Witkovich,
for similar good and sufficient reason, went against a strongly indicated construc-
tion, indeed a necessary one, all but, though happily not quite, forced by the
language of the statute. just so, we contend, the Court should have done in
Lincoln Mills, again for good reason.
'09 See cases cited note 31 supra.
110 For the constitutional issue raised in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), see FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUrnEM CoURT 73 (1949). The
constitutional issue has recently risen to obscure the Court's course to a result
which, if correct, should have been reached on its own merits. See Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
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respect for the peculiar powers and competences of both institu-
tions.
What then should have been the disposition of Lincoln Mills?
The answer is any form of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction which
does no violence to the statutory language. The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit found one when it decided Lincoln Mills.
It held that section 3oi gave no jurisdiction in equity, only at
law."' Justices Frankfurter, Burton, and Minton, avoiding the
constitutional issue in the Westinghouse case, found one that was
suitable on the facts before them there." 2 There will be other
ways in other circumstances." 3 It goes without saying that such
dispositions of cases do not themselves perform the function that
we have contended the Court should perform. They merely
create the opportunity for its exercise. The function itself con-
sists of a deliberate and candid exposition of the reasons that
have led the Court to its result. Such an exposition should, of
course, dwell on the institutional issue which emerges from
section 3O. Such an exposition, it may be said, could as well
accompany acceptance of jurisdiction. But it would then plainly
have little or no effectiveness, since it would fail to create any
pressure for the desired congressional reconsideration.
III. LINCOLN MILLS: THE OPINIONS OF THE JUSTICES
The opinion of the Court in Lincoln Mills was delivered by
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for a majority of five. The Court
held that section 3oi (without the aid of the Arbitration Act),
authorized granting a decree of specific performance. The Court
also decided that federal substantive law, to be created by the
federal courts as best they can, is applicable under section 3Oi. 1 4
This latter conclusion, which intrudes upon state power, which
"I Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81 (sth Cir. x956), rev'd,
353 U.S. 448 (x957).
112 See note 28 supra.
113 For example, if the breach of contract constitutes an unfair labor practice, a
district court could decline jurisdiction upon the ground that exclusive primary
jurisdiction resides in the National Labor Relations Board. See Reinauer Transp.
Cos. v. United Marine Div., 112 F. Supp. 940, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
114 This resulted in reversal of the judgment of the Fifth Circuit. See note ixu
supra. The judgments of two cases were affirmed. General Elec. Co. v. Local 205,
United Elec. Workers, 353 U.S. 547 (1957), affirming 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. x956);
Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers, 353 U.S. 55o (x957), affirming
233 F.2d 104 (ist Cir. I956). However, judge Magruder's conclusions respecting
the application of the Arbitration Act were implicitly overruled.
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finds no support in the language of the statute and insignificant
support in the legislative history, received no explanation in the
opinion.
The bits and snatches of legislative history which Mr. Justice
Douglas summons to his aid may tend to demonstrate a specific
concern on the part of Congress with equitable relief and arbitra-
tion. There are other bits and other snatches which tend to show
the contrary.115 A determination that section 3o empowers a
district court to compel arbitration cannot reasonably rest on
-statements in the legislative history; it must be reached by a
subtler method of construction such as that employed by Judge
Magruder. In any event, this determination has no bearing on
whether the applicable substantive law is to be state or federal;
nor does any part of the legislative history referred to in the
Court's opinion bear upon this fundamental problem. The opinion
of the Court indicates that it was quite clearly considered a dis-
tinct problem," 6 for after holding that section 3oi authorized
115 Representative Case: "The Taft-Hartley bill incorporates some other pro-
visions which were in the Case bill of last year and which are pretty much ac-
cepted as proper subjects of legislation. For instance, the bill establishes suability
for and by labor organizations as entities. The bill last year did that." 93 CONG.
REc. 6283 (i947). The Case Bill referred to above originally provided that in
the event of breach of a collective bargaining agreement, "a suit for damages
...or for injunctive relief in equity may be maintained by the other party or
parties in any United States district court having jurisdiction of the parties." 92
CONG. RFc. 765 (1946). (Emphasis added.) The bill passed the House, however,
without any reference to injunctive relief. This portion of the Case Bill, which
evolved eventually, albeit in an extremely different form, into § 3o of the Taft-
Hartley Act, never again in its ever-changing form contained any reference to
"injunctive relief in equity2'
." At one point the Court's opinion does tend to fuse these separate questions,
by stating that the overwhelming number of courts hold that § 30X "authorizes
federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these col-
lective bargaining agreements and includes within that federal law specific per-
formance of promises to arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining agree-
ments. Perhaps," the opinion continues, ",the leading decision representing that
point of view is the one rendered by Judge Wyzanski .. . ." 353 U.S. at 451.
In Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D.
Mass. 1953) the district court held only "the Congress which enacted § 3oi would
have preferred that remedies should be determined without reference to state law and
should include specific enforcement of arbitration clauses in labor contracts." Id.
at 141. (Emphasis in original.) Judge Wyzanski expressly declined to hold that
federal law regulates substantive rights under § 301. "Since both suggested con-
structions of § 301 present difficulties, only when the Supreme Court of the United
States speaks shall we know finally whether federal courts acting under § 3o are
to apply federal or local law to determine the rights of the parties." Ibid. (Em-
phasis in original.)
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specific performance the opinion turned to what was clearly con-
ceived of as another issue, saying, "The question then is, what
is the substantive law to be applied in suits under § 301 (a)?"
In the next sentence the query was answered: "We conclude that
the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal
law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national
labor laws." Several succeeding sentences outline in the most
general way the sources and guides to which judges presumably
will turn in the continuing task of fashioning federal law, and
the first sentence of the next paragraph of the opinion suggests
that "it is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal
law where federal rights are concerned." After citing authority
for this proposition, the opinion continues: "Congress has indi-
cated by § 301 (a) the purpose to follow that course here." With-
out amplifying this assertion, the Court then makes a concluding
statement upon this aspect of the case: "There is no constitutional
difficulty. Article III, § 2, extends the judicial power to cases
'arising under ... the Laws of the United States ... .I The
power of Congress to regulate these labor-management contro-
versies under the Commerce Clause is plain. . . .A case or con-
troversy arising under § 301 (a) is, therefore, one within the pur-
view of judicial power as defined in Article III." 117 Thus was this
determination of far-reaching consequences rendered without
opinion.118
117 353 U.S. at 456-57.
118 In Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (ig55), the only other Supreme Court discussion dealing with
§ 301, Justice Reed, in a short concurring opinion, discussed the source of the
substantive right under § 301. "[Tihe contracts sued upon ...will have been
entered into in accordance with federal law; and although federal law does not set
forth explicitly just what constitutes a breach, § 3oI, by granting federal juris-
diction over actions between employers and unions on collective bargaining con-
tracts, does make breaches of them by either of those parties actionable." Id. at
462. And, "it may be that in proper litigation under § 301 it will be necessary
for federal courts to draw largely on state law for the solution of issues. In
such instances state law is relied upon because its application is not contrary to
federal policy, but supplements and fulfills it." Id. at 463. And finally, "whether
the rules of substantive law applied by the federal courts are derived from federal
or state sources is immaterial. The rules are truly federal, not state. The cause
of action for breach of contract is thus a cause of action arising under federal law,
the source of federal judicial power under Art. I of the Constitution." Id. at
463-64. These statements were advanced by the Justice to sustain his dictum that
§ 301 was constitutional.
The only other opinion in Westinghouse to suggest that substantive rights are
regulated by federal law was that of Justice Douglas. His dissent, in which Jus-
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Mr. Justice Burton, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, concurred
separately, agreeing that section 301 empowered the Court to
grant specific performance. He concluded, however, that the sec-
tion does not require federal courts to make federal substantive
law. Coming in this fashion to confront the constitutional issue,
he had joined Mr. Justice Frankfurter in avoiding in the Westing-
house case, Mr. Justice Burton held section 301 constitutional as
an exercise of protective federal jurisdiction." 9
Mr. Justice Frankfurter alone dissented in the Lincoln Mills
case. It was he alone who faced and discussed the institutional
issue which, in our view, is decisive. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
concluded that there is danger for the courts in their assuming
the task section 301 seeks to impose, a task which is not "meet
or fit" for the judicial process. The Justice concluded also that
the Arbitration Act could not apply in this case and that section
3oi itself does not create the equitable remedy of a decree of
specific performance. This portion of the Justice's opinion would,
in our view, not only have disposed of the case but have disposed
of it for exactly the right reasons: the performance of the Court's
proper function vis-h-vis the Congress. The Justice, however,
deemed it necessary to reach and decide the constitutional issue
he had avoided in the Westinghouse case and this despite the fact
that the Court itself, given its conclusions, did not arrive at this
constitutional question. Mr. Justice Frankfurter held section
301 unconstitutional.2
IV. CONCLUSION
In the wise distribution of governmental powers, this Court
cannot do what a President sometimes does in returning a bill to
Congress. We cannot return this provision [section 301] to Con-
gress and respectfully request that body to face the responsibility
placed upon it by the Constitution to define the jurisdiction of the
tice Black (who did not participate in Lincoln Mills) joined, contained one para-
graph upon the source-of-law question. It is here reproduced in its entirety. "I
agree with Mr. Justice Reed that Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act created fed-
eral sanctions for collective bargaining agreements, made the cases and contro-
versies concerning them justiciable questions for the federal courts, and permitted
those courts to fashion from the federal statute, from state law, or from other
germane sources, federal rules for construction and interpretation of those col-
lective bargaining agreements." Id. at 465.
119 353 U.S. at 459 (concurring opinion).
"O Id. at 460 (dissenting opinion).
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lower courts with some particularity and not to leave these courts at
large.'
2'
So read the first two sentences of the concluding paragraph of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Lincoln Mills. We have,
in this paper, presented as legitimate a function which is very
much indeed like the function Mr. Justice Frankfurter declines
to assume in the passage just quoted. We have further posed the
hypothesis that the Court and dissenting Justices have been
known to perform just this function, either on the tacit assump-
tion that it is legitimate or by employing traditional formulas as
a screen. We defend the remanding function, as we have called
it, only in context of an issue such as Lincoln Mills raised. Its
extension should be undertaken only with great care. But in any
event, if there is anything to our hypothesis we have contended
simply that a function to which the Court is no stranger be dis-
charged with candor, and that the side-effects which encumber
its exercise when it takes the form of traditional maxims be
eliminated. There are few occasions when the candid and delib-
erate confrontation of the truly decisive issue is not the most
desirable course for the Court to take. 2
121 Id. at 484 (dissenting opinion).
122 We would not venture such a statement if "courts" rather than "the Court"
were in question. We do not presume to disparage entirely the time-honored place
of fictions in the law. Fictions can be useful, and a traditional approach may
serve to contain the unsophisticated or the willful decision-maker.
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